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Abstract
We estimate the heterogeneous impact of the scale, composition and consumer good
effect of ethnic diversity on individuals’ job and residential location. Using an extensive
pooled micro panel data set in which homeowners in the Netherlands are identified in
both the housing and labor market, we can derive the combined effect of ethnic diversity
in both markets. We test a model that integrates the utility and production function such
that the location of work and residence is determined simultaneously by taking into
account observed and unobserved heterogeneous individual behavior on both markets.
We find that the scale of ethnic diversity, that is the share of immigrants, at the city level
is mostly positively related to both wages and house prices. This is mainly through a
positive productivity effect of immigrants, which results in negative implicit prices for
housing (although small) in a city with a higher scale of ethnic diversity for the majority of
the individuals in our data. The scale of ethnic diversity is only positively related to utility
for a small group of homeowners, while the composition (diversity among immigrants)
and the consumer good-effect (ethnic diversity of restaurants) of ethnic diversity show
overall no significant effect on both markets nor significant implicit prices. Moreover, we
find that the majority of Dutch homeowners do not sort themselves out over
municipalities by their preferences for ethnic diversity.
Keywords: Heterogeneity, ethnic diversity, valuation, amenities, microdata
JEL classifications: R12, R23, R3
Date submitted: 8 July 2016 Editorial decision: 31 October 2018 Date accepted: 8 November
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1. Introduction
Many European countries are experiencing a rapidly changing population composition,
resulting in increased diversity associated with new and growing immigrant groups.
Whether the impact of diversity on economic outcomes is positive (a diversity dividend)
or negative (a diversity debit) is still very much a matter of empirical debate (see,
e.g. Kemeny, 2014). In general, there is evidence that, at least for specific types of firms
(mostly large, multinational and high-tech firms) or specific types of workers, a
moderate amount of diversity seems beneficial for productivity and innovativeness (see,
e.g. Docquier et al., 2013; Ozgen and de Graaff, 2013; Peri et al., 2015; Trax
et al., 2015; Nathan, 2016; Kemeny and Cooke, 2018). For residential-specific
preferences of workers, an increase in immigrants may positively impact house prices
 The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
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and rents due to a demand–effect (see, e.g. Saiz, 2003, 2007; Saiz and
Wachter, 2011; Sanchis-Guarner, 2013). However, the empirical evidence on the
effect of diversity on utility-related measures of location-specific preferences of workers
is much scarcer and points toward a small effect with varying sign, depending on the
level at which location preferences are measured (cities, neighborhoods, etc.) (see, e.g.
Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006; Bakens et al., 2013).
Most of the research focuses on the average effect of diversity on economic outcomes.
In this article, we test the hypothesis that the utility derived from living or working in
ethnically diverse cities1 differs among individuals. We argue that most studies that look
at the average effect of a diverse population on the local economy forgo important
individual-level variation in these effects. If the working population consists of individuals
whose preferences for ethnic diversity differ, then spatial sorting is likely to occur in the
presence of spatial differences in ethnic diversity. As is shown in Combes et al. (2008)
and Bakens et al. (2013), individual characteristics are an important factor in explaining
productivity differences between individuals, and the subsequent sorting of workers over
regions. Workers locate in an area that gives them the highest real utility, which from a
regional equilibrium point of view, is based on the trade-off between nominal wages, the
costs of housing and preferences for (residential) amenities (Rosen, 1974; Roback, 1982).
The empirical question is to what extent the effect of ethnic diversity prevails in this trade-
off between the labor market and/or the housing market. The effect on the former
involves productivity externalities caused by ethnic diversity in firms or the local labor
market. The effect on the latter involves changes in utility from local ethnic consumer
amenities, such as a more diversified supply of products and services.
In research on the economic impact of immigrants on receiving regions, the focus on
the productivity effect is mostly prevailing. Based on the idea of immigrants’ skills
complementarity in production, more immigrants or more diverse immigrants may
increase productivity (for a more detailed description of the mechanisms, see Alesina
et al., 2000). In addition, there may also be counter effects of more diversity if this
hampers, for example, communication (Lazear, 1999). In the research that tests these
hypotheses, the scale (teams, firms, regional labor markets) at which these effects may
occur is an important research question (Trax et al., 2015; Nathan, 2016; Kemeny and
Cooke, 2018), but also how to measure this complementarity in terms of diversity
measures (see for recent discussions on the measurement of diversity, Nijkamp and
Poot, 2015; Desmet et al., 2017). Generally, measures are used that focus on the number
of workers from different ethnic or cultural groups, and the size of these groups. In this
research, we focus on a scale effect (the immigrant share), and a composition effect (the
diversity among immigrants), following Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Alesina et al. (2016)
as a city can be more diverse if there are more immigrants, and be more diverse if there
are immigrants from a larger number of different countries.2 We distinguish these two
population effects to disentangle whether it is the number of immigrants that may
impact productivity or utility, or whether it is their composition that matters. In
addition, we include a third measure of ethnic diversity, a consumer good-effect
measured by the ethnic diversity of the cuisine of restaurants. With the increase of
1 This analysis focuses on municipalities, which in the remainder of this article we will refer to as cities.
2 We define these measures in Section 4 and in Supplementary Appendix Table A1. Following the Statistics
Netherlands’ definition of an immigrant, both the first- and second-generation immigrants are included.
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immigrants in an area, the area is likely to become more diverse in terms of consumer
goods supplied. This stems from immigrant’s consumption patterns, but also their
supply of other goods as entrepreneurs (see, e.g. Waldfogel, 2008; Mazzolari and
Neumark, 2012; Pekkala Kerr and Kerr, 2016). If consumers value local product
heterogeneity (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), as is argued to be an attractive feature of cities
by Glaeser et al. (2001), then immigrants may increase consumer’s utility. We jointly
evaluate these three diversity measures in the labor and housing markets to research
whether these effects dominantly relate to productivity or utility effects.
Figures 1 and 2 give the quartile distributions of incomes and house prices depending
on the immigrant shares, the diversity among immigrants and diversity of restaurants in
a city. Indeed, at first sight, it appears that the distributions of income—albeit
moderately—and house prices correlate with the upper quartiles of the scale,
composition and consumer good effect of ethnic diversity. If individuals sort into
cities with different ethnic amenity endowments, then it is not a priori clear which
individual characteristics may lead to these different valuations of ethnic diversity. We
therefore adopt an empirical approach in which we assume that differences in valuation
of ethnic diversity can be inferred based on a worker’s simultaneous behavior in both
the housing and labor market and his or her preferences for amenities
(following Roback, 1982). We do so by estimating a multivariate latent class model.
This enables us to identify subgroups in the data as well as the simultaneous decisions of
workers in both markets without prior knowledge about the individual characteristics
that cause these differences. Consequently, an ex post facto description of the
differences between subgroups in terms of the characteristics of individuals provides
insights into drivers that may determine to which subgroup an individual belongs.
The main contribution of our article to the literature is 3-fold. First, our approach
overcomes the methodological issues inherent in most research on this topic that
depends heavily on the specific subsample chosen or are focused on the ‘average’ effect.
The latter issue is concerned with the fact that it is either assumed that all individuals
benefit equally from ethnic diversity or that specific homogeneous groups of individuals
are sampled to control for possible variation in the impacts (see, e.g. Florida, 2002;
Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006; Dalmazzo and de Blasio, 2011 ). The usual approach to
account for possible heterogeneity in the effects is to use individual fixed effects. This
approach controls for (un)observed individual characteristics that might determine
differences in utility and preferences.3 However, it is precisely these (un)observed
heterogeneous individual characteristics that play an important role in explaining the
individual differences in wages and utility (Bakens et al., 2013). Thus, disregarding
individual variation in characteristics by focusing on the average effects of ethnic
diversity on wages and utility very likely provides a misguided view of the effects of
ethnic diversity on specific population groups. By using a finite mixture model, no pre-
determined samples of individuals need to be made, but effects can be estimated over
different groups within the model. Although there is related research in which Ozgen
and de Graaff (2013) and Nathan (2016) apply finite mixture models to analyze the
effect of (ethnic) diversity on productivity and innovation, and Kemeny and
3 In many papers, correctly controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals is a challange. The
recent paper by Kemeny and Cooke (2018) uses matched employer–employee data from the USA to
control for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals.
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Cooke (2018) analyze the effect of ethnic diversity on productivity along wage quartiles,
we are not aware of other research that explores heterogeneous effects of population
diversity on individual utility.
Secondly, by using a theoretical framework based upon Roback (1982, 1988), we
show that failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously in both labor
and housing markets results in biased estimates of the impacts of diversity on wages and
utility. Our empirical analysis indeed shows that estimating wage and housing prices
separately yield different results when compared with our simultaneous estimation.
Finally, we employ an extensive micro dataset consisting of a pooled cross-section of
administrative income and housing data between 1998 and 2008 in the Netherlands.
This data focus on homeowners in the labor and the housing market. The micro-data
allow a simultaneous estimation of an individual’s correlated choice of location of living
and work and we explicitly allow individuals to work and live in different cities.
Relaxing the assumption that the amenity endowment in the area of work is equal to
that of the area of residence accommodates the empirical setting in many countries,
especially in the Netherlands, where half of the workers do not live in the same
municipality in which they work. Because we use a pooled cross-section instead of panel
data,4 this article is focused more on estimating possible heterogeneity in correlations
for different individuals than on causal effects.
To anticipate our results, we find four different homogeneous groups in our data in
terms of the valuation of ethnic diversity. There is one large group, which includes
Figure 2. Distribution of house prices (per square meter) over (ethnic) amenity quartiles at the
city level.
Figure 1. Distribution of income over (ethnic) amenity quartiles at the city level.
4 There are repeated observations for a specific subset of our data. However, only selecting homeowners
who move at least twice in 10 years, gives a more specific subsample of individuals than only homeowners
who moved between 1998 and 2008 and may therefore give biased results.






/joeg/article-abstract/20/1/197/5259356 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 27 July 2020
almost 72% of the individuals in our data set, and three smaller groups. The groups
differ in terms of their location patterns, with the smaller two groups clustering in and
around the largest cities in the country and the other small group clustering in the
periphery of the Netherlands. The largest group is more dispersed over the country. For
most individuals in our data set (the large group and two other small groups), we find a
positive and statistically significant correlation between their productivity and the scale
of ethnic diversity, in that both the wages and rents are higher for these individuals if
the immigrant share in the city of work and city of residence is higher. For a small
group of individuals, we find a statistically significant utility effect of the scale of ethnic
diversity. The group that is concentrated in areas with fewer immigrants shows a
positive correlation between the utility and the share of immigrants, while the group
concentrated in and around the largest cities of the Netherlands show a negative
correlation between their utility and the share of immigrants. For the composition and
the consumer good effect of ethnic diversity, we do not find a jointly statistically
significant correlation between the labor and housing market outcomes for most of the
individuals in our data set. The dominance of one large group, with smaller groups that
show different results, and the prevailing positive effect of the share of immigrants on
productivity holds against various robustness checks. A welfare analysis shows that the
implicit prices for higher (or lower) immigrant share, immigrant diversity and
restaurant diversity are very moderate. For most individuals in our data set (ethnic),
amenities do not play a large role in explaining location patterns.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents
explicitly our assumptions in combination with a theoretical equilibrium model
describing the location choices of individuals based on local amenities in the labor and
housing markets. We discuss the estimation of a finite mixture model in Section 3.
Section 4 describes the data we use in our empirical analysis. Section 5 gives the results
and postdescriptives of the groups we identify using the finite mixture model.
Subsequently, Section 6 discusses the results of various robustness checks. The last
section concludes.
2. Modeling framework
To assess the heterogeneous valuation of ethnic diversity, we adopt a spatial
equilibrium modeling framework where heterogeneous households and firms sort
over municipal amenities. We first describe such a polycentric urban system, and then
construct an empirical model that is able to account for differences in workers’
preferences and firms’ cost structures with respect to varying endowments of amenities
and lose the restriction that workers and firms have to be located in the same location.
2.1. Heterogeneous returns to diversity within a polycentric urban system
We consider a closed spatial system, where cities (s 2 1; . . . ;S) are characterized by
varying endowments of a set of exogenous amenities (s). We consider the endowments
of land and the supply of housing as fixed. Amenities can only be consumed or used as a
production input locally, but we do allow for commuting between cities.5 Within cities,
5 More realistically, we could assume that transportation costs for labor are lower than for amenities.
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the landscape is considered homogeneous, so there are no intra-city commuting costs
(see, e.g. Glaeser, 2008). We assume that workers are homogeneous apart from their
preferences for amenities. Analogously, on the demand side, we assume that firms differ
in the productivity effects of amenities. Apart from this, firms are similar and both
produce a final good x.
To understand what happens when a location becomes more amenable, Figure 3
depicts the three possible resulting outcomes for the simplest case of a specific city with
homogeneous types of workers and firms, and only one amenity (conform
Roback, 1982, 1988; Ottaviano and Peri, 2005). Consider location A where workers
receive wages ! and pay rents r in a city with a specific amenity endowment  leading to
a generic cost level c for firms and utility k for workers. We consider an exogenous
increase of the amenity endowment . If amenity  is both amenable to firms and
workers, then the only possible new outcome—with zero moving costs for firms and
workers—would be location D, with higher rents and an ambiguous change in wages.
Which means that the city becomes more attractive to workers and firms, leading to
higher rents, and firms are willing to pay higher wages while workers accept lower real
wages. Consequently, if the amenity is only amenable to workers and not to firms, the
new location would be B with lower wages and higher rents. In the case only firms
benefit from the increase in  and not the workers, the new location would be C, where
both rents and wages increase.
The model described above is not in line with at least three stylized facts. Firstly,
cities differ from each other in combinations of multiple amenities. Second, commuting
yields different amenities for places of work and places of residence (especially in
polycentric city structures). Third, firms differ in the impact of amenities on their cost
structure (if not only by sector) and workers differ in the impact of amenities on
preferences. Note, that if we only allow for heterogeneity in workers’ preferences and
firms’ cost structures with respect to varying endowments of a single amenity, then
perfect sorting would occur. In combination with commuting and multiple amenities,
however, perfect sorting for one amenity is less likely and combinations of firm and
worker types in the same location could occur.
Therefore, we extend the model in three ways. Firstly, we allow workers and firms to
benefit from multiple amenities. So, we regard s as a city-specific set of amenities.
Second, we introduce heterogeneity in workers’ preferences and firms’ cost structures.
Some workers may have a preference for ethnic diversity, while others might have
strong preferences for natural amenities. We therefore model different preferences
among workers (so for workers of type i, it is UiðsÞ) and different cost structures among
firms (for firms of type j, it is CjðsÞ). Note that this notation is deliberately very general
and allows for city-specific preferences and cost structures as well, regardless of the size
of the amenities. Due to social network structures, workers and firms might be tied to a
specific city. Finally, workers do not necessarily have to live in the city where they work.
Especially for a country such as the Netherlands, with its polycentric structure,
commuting is very important.
These three extensions yield a more complex and realistic trade-off than the
traditional set-up. Because workers are heterogeneous and multiple amenities might
play a role, workers with different preferences who pay similar rents and receive similar
wages could still have similar indirect utility levels. Additionally, if cities become too
expensive for some workers, then they opt out by commuting into the city, whereas they
pay lower rents but receive lower wages (net of commuting costs) as well. For firms, a
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similar reasoning holds. The next subsection describes how we extend the seminal
Roback (1982) model with these three elements.
2.2. Modeling a polycentric urban system with varying amenities
To derive our empirical specification, we adopt the framework of Ottaviano and
Peri (2005) which itself builds on earlier work of Rosen (1974), and
Roback (1982, 1988). Specifically, we extend Ottaviano and Peri (2005) by allowing
for commuting and heterogeneous workers and firms. The heterogeneous preferences
for amenities of workers of type i, living in city s, working in a firm of type j in city  are






with expðisÞ the impact of the whole set of local amenities  in city s on utility U for
workers of type i,6 H the amount of housing workers of type i consume in s and Y a
Hicksian composite good. Commuting is introduced by assuming that each worker of
type i only receives monthly labor income !ijs (wages !ijs net of commuting costs ts)
7
which she receives from working in a firm of type j in city  and can only spend on land
and consumption goods.
For firms, we introduce heterogeneity in the production effects of amenities by using










v(ω, r; θ) = k
v(ω, r; θ) = k
c(ω, r; θ) = c
c(ω, r; θ) = c
r
ω
Figure 3. Changes in wages and rents with varying amenity endowments.
6 We model the impact of amenities exponentially. This is mainly for convenience as to avoid taking the
logarithms of zero later on in the model. Models with linear impacts of amenities yield qualitatively
similar results.
7 We refrain from specifying the commuting costs ts. Our only assumption here is that between each
possible city pair there are exogeneously given positive commuting costs. In our empirical specification, ts
is measured as a loss in net wages governed by the value of travel time.






/joeg/article-abstract/20/1/197/5259356 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 27 July 2020
where L is the amount of labor firms of type j employ and expðjÞ denotes the impact
of the whole set of amenities  in city  on the productivity Y of firms of type j.
We consider our spatial economy in equilibrium if no worker of type i and firm of
type j have an incentive to migrate. In addition, workers and firms in the same location
pay similar rents, workers of type i have similar utility levels across cities (and earn
similar wages within cities net of commuting costs), and firms of type j face equal costs
across cities.
Note that we still allow for workers to work for different types of firms and in
different cities. Moreover, this implies that workers and firms of different types do not
necessarily have similar utility levels or costs levels, and firms profiting from amenities
are able to pay higher wages and drive up rents in these locations.
Clearing of factor prices results in a wage and rent equation for each type of worker
and firm combination. As it is impossible to observe all relevant amenities, we separate
the vector of city-specific amenities in Equations (2.1) and (2.2) in a vector of observed
o and unobserved amenities u. Moreover, if we allow for additional control variables
X andH, then our set-up yields the following reduced-form wage and rent equations for
workers i living in city s working for firm j in city 8:
ln!ijs ¼ 1Xj þ ½2 ln ð
o
isÞ þ 3 ln ð
o
jÞ þ ½4 ln ð
u
isÞ þ 5 ln ð
u
jÞ þ 	ijs ð2:3Þ













jÞ þ ijs ð2:4Þ
If there are relevant and unobserved amenities such as the ones between the second pair
of square brackets (uis and 
u
j) in Equations (2.3) and (2.4), and if they correlate with the
observed amenities or with the other explanatory variables (Xjk and His), then it is
straightforward to see that failing to account for unobserved amenities that affect utility
or production leads to biased estimates in both the wage and the rent equation. Without
appropriate instruments for both ois and 
o
j, it is therefore crucial that the rent and
wage Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are estimated simultaneously, and the unobserved
heterogeneity bias in both equations is properly accounted for.9 In the next section, we
lay out the methodology to do this.
3. A Multivariate Finite Mixture Model
We estimate Equations (2.3) and (2.4) by adopting a latent class model in the form of a
multivariate finite mixture model. In a finite mixture model (FMM), the allocation of
individuals to groups is defined within the model estimation (see McLachlan and
Peel, 2000). The different groups, or classes, are thus not defined a priori based on the
8 Apart from introducing heterogeneity and commuting costs—and its implications for the spatial
equilibrium—the model does not deviate in its mechanics from that of Ottaviano and Peri (2005). For
more details, we therefore refer to their paper.
9 The most common approach is to use instrumental variables that correlate with amenities (in our case
ethnic diversity), but are independent from both the labor and the housing market. Unfortunately, these
are very hard to find and even deep-lagging—for example, looking at the population structure in the
past—might not necessarily yield instruments that are independent from both wages and rents conditional
on current population structure (see Deaton, 2010). A fruitful future approach might be to look at the
location patterns of refugees as their location choices are typically severely limited—at least in the short
run. Unfortunately, our data does not capture refugees.
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observed characteristics. Moreover, a multivariate finite mixture model makes it
possible to deal with the fact that choosing where to work and where to live are
correlated decisions in which observed and unobserved individual characteristics affect
both decisions. The result is a number of groups that differ in terms of observed
characteristics between the groups, while within the groups individuals are considered
to be homogeneous in their preferences.
In our model, we make three specific assumptions. First, we assume that individual
and housing characteristics have a generic effect on wages and rents while preferences
for amenities have a heterogeneous effect on wages and rents. As shown in Equations
(3.1) and (3.2), we thus assume that individual characteristics affect wages, and housing
characteristics impact housing prices homogeneously across all individuals in our
sample, while the effect of amenities is considered to be heterogeneous.10
Second, we assume that the observations are taken from a population that is a
mixture of z homogeneous groups with mixing proportions (McLachlan and
Peel, 2000). We do not know, a priori, from which group we observe wages ð ln!ijsÞ
and housing prices ð ln rijsÞ.
Finally, following the theoretical specification of Roback (1988), we allow the
housing and labor market to be correlated by strictly imposing that the composition of
the groups for the labor and housing markets is similar, that is, if a worker is part of a
specific group in the labor market, then she is also part of that same specific group in
the housing market. This allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the
preferences among different groups in both the labor and the housing market.
We simultaneously estimate the following system of equations:
ln!ist ¼ 0;z þ 1Xit þ 2;z ln ðtÞ þ t þ 	ist ð3:1Þ
ln rist ¼ 
0;z þ 
1Hist þ 
2;z ln ðstÞ þ  t þ ist ð3:2Þ
where !ist is the wage—net of commuting costs—of individual i living in city s and
working in city  in year y, and rist is the housing price per square meter of individual i
living in city s in year t. The coefficients related to the vector of individual
characteristics in the labor market, 1, and the set of dwelling characteristics of
individual i’s house, 
1, are homogeneously estimated. The following individual
characteristics are included in X: education level, age, sector of employment, household
type, a dummy for males, a dummy for an individual member of a double-income
couple, and a dummy for natives. The following dwelling characteristics are included in
H: the number of rooms, the type of dwelling, the construction period, a garden dummy
and a dummy for good maintenance. The constant terms, the coefficients corresponding
to the vectors of amenities t and st, are allowed to be specific to group z. Because we
do not know, a priori, which amenities affect individual preferences and firm
productivity, we consider the same set of amenities for both regressions. To control
for year-specific effects, we include year dummies t and  t. Finally,  and 	 are the
error terms, which are assumed to be correlated because the decision regarding the
10 Because we are predominantly interested in differences in preferences for amenities, this assumption
greatly simplifies our estimations. However, it can be argued that the effect of age or sector of
employment on wages might be heterogeneous and that preferences for housing characteristics differ.
Here, we aim to control only for the individual and housing characteristics on wages and house prices,
respectively.
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location of work and the location of residence are made in tandem or because one
restricts the other as explained above.11
We use a multivariate finite mixture model to estimate Equations (3.1) and (3.2)
simultaneously.12 A finite mixture of regressions assumes that the observations in a data
set can be from z different groups, with each group following a different parametric
distribution. The maximization of the log-likelihood function is implemented using the
iterative expectation maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977). In the first
step (E-step), the expected value of the complete log-likelihood function with respect to
different groups is computed at the current estimate of the parameters. Because there is
no straightforward way of distinguishing the different groups, this step calculates the
posterior probability of individual i belonging to group z. The second step (M-step)
maximizes the log-likelihood of the function derived in the first step. The regression
coefficients for each group are estimated using the probability weights for that group
for all individuals and are then used to determine the expected value of the complete
log-likelihood function in the next E-step. This procedure iterates until convergence is
achieved.
4. Data
Our analysis is based on a data set that contains observations of individuals in the labor
and the housing markets in the Netherlands. The data consist of house transaction
prices between 1999 and 2008, which are provided by the Dutch Association of Real
Estate Agencies (NVM). The house transaction data include information on the
transaction date, transaction price, dwelling characteristics and location.13 About 50–
70% of all residential houses sold in the Netherlands are registered by NVM, with a
slight oversampling of the more populated areas of the Netherlands. For each house
sold, the owner of the house is identified using administrative municipality data from
Statistics Netherlands. Each adult (maximum of two per house) who has an income
from (self-)employed work and who moved to the address within 9 months of the date,
the house was sold is included in the data set.14 We only include individuals that stay
11 Both wages and housing prices are in constant 2008 prices.
12 We refer to McLachlan and Peel (2000), Grun and Leisch (2008) and Wedel and Kamakura (2012) for
detailed information on finite mixture model estimations. For the estimation procedure, we use the
flexmix package developed in R by Grun and Leisch (2008).
13 We only select transactions between E30,000 and E15,000,000 in constant 2008 prices and with a
minimum floor area of 30 m2. Additionally, houses sold for more than twice or less than one-third of the
initial offer price are excluded.
14 We do not perform the analysis on households or household heads because, in general, in the
Netherlands if a couple has two incomes, both incomes are used to obtain a mortgage and therefore the
individual characteristics of the labor and housing markets of both matter. Van der Straaten and
Rouwendal (2010) studied the co-location decisions of the so-called power couples in the Netherlands
and found that proximity to dense labor market areas, railway stations and urban amenities is more
important for double-income couples than for average households. In the analysis in this article, we
include a dummy variable for individuals who are part of a double-income couple. Still, the disadvantage
of treating a couple as an individual decision maker is that we underestimate income in that individual
rather than household income is used. As a robustness check, we also estimate the model with only
single-earner households. In addition, we also check whether our results are robust when we use a
homogeneous sample of males within the age cohort of 30–45. The subsample with single-earner
households, and the sample with only males are much smaller than the original dataset, but show
generally comparable results. The results of these estimates can be found in the Supplementary Appendix
Tables A10–A15.
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registered at that address for 490 days. The administrative municipality data also
include individual demographic information such as date of birth, country of birth (also
that of both parents) and gender.
The constructed data set of homeowners is linked to firm data to identify the work
location, sector of employment and income of the homeowners. The labor market data
are also provided by Statistics Netherlands.15 For employed individuals, we obtain the
yearly wage by multiplying the daily wage with an average working year of 261 days.
For self-employed individuals, we use the reported yearly profit. All income is stated in
constant 2008 prices. We refer to Supplementary Appendix Table A1 for a detailed
description of all variables. Because we allow for commuting, we correct the yearly
wage for commuting costs if the city of residence is different from the city of work.
According to research on Dutch mobility (Olde Kalter et al., 2010), the average travel
speed for commuting is 45 km/h (or 0.75 km/min) by car, and the average value of time
is E8 per hour (or E0.133/min). Because only Euclidean distance is readily available, we
multiply the distance by 1.3 to approach real distances. Considering 261 working days
per year and the time spent commuting to and from work, we construct individual
yearly travel time costs and deduct these from individual wages. Amenity data for each
Dutch municipality, such as the number of shops, theaters, museums and restaurants,
but also job and population density, and the share of highly educated workers are
provided by Statistics Netherlands and the Real-Estate Monitor (‘Vastgoed monitor’)
of ABF research.
Whereas we use house prices to identify location preferences, rents are more often
used for this purpose (see, e.g. the original work of Roback, 1982, and Ottaviano and
Peri, 2005, 2006). Because we only have house prices available and therefore capture the
characteristics of homeowners, our sample and results are not representative of the
entire population of workers. Our sample is biased because we do not capture the lower
end of the income distribution, that is, that part of the labor force that includes
individuals who earn too little to be a homeowner, nor the unemployed. The results can
also be biased if homeowners are selected into homeownership based on unobserved
individual characteristics if these characteristics lead to, for example (better) jobs with
higher incomes.16 In the Netherlands, the largest share of the rental market is rent
controlled, especially in the larger cities, and the rent for social housing is based on
housing characteristics only, irrespective of the location of the dwelling. Rents,
therefore, do not reflect a willingness to pay for living in an area or a valuation of local
amenities, as is assumed in hedonic approaches and regional equilibrium models like
those in Rosen (1974), Roback (1982). For these reasons, using rents, if available, are
not preferred in the present study.
We measure the scale of diversity by the share of immigrants in a city as a city is more
diverse if there are overall more immigrants. Because we are also interested in the
composition effect of ethnic diversity, we include the so-called diversity index in our
15 We do not look into ethnic diversity at the level of the workplace for individuals in our data set as done
by, for example, Möhlmann and Bakens (2015); Trax et al. (2015); Kemeny and Cooke (2018); however,
they find that the effect of firm diversity on (firm) productivity is much lower, or not statistically
significant, compared to the effect of city-level diversity on productivity.
16 Using transaction prices leads to another selection bias if the sample of houses sold at a specific time and
location are of a specific character. For example, smaller houses for starters on the housing market
generally have a higher turnover rate than larger, more expensive houses.
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regression. In general, the largest cities have the highest shares of immigrants, and the
size effect of immigrants is thus very much related to the scale of a city. By disentangling
a diversity index that includes all ethnic groups in the immigrant share from a diversity
index that distinguishes among groups of migrants, we are able to distinguish between
the scale effect of immigrants and their diversity (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Alesina
et al., 2016) and estimate whether it is the number of immigrants that matter for
economic outcomes in our model, or the diversity of immigrants (or both). The diversity
index among immigrants for cities shows the probability that two randomly selected







where sce is the share of people from ethnic group e among the immigrants of city c. An
index value of 0 indicates that all immigrants living in a city belong to the same ethnic
group, whereas all belong to different ethnic groups when the index value is 1.17 We
identify an individual’s ethnicity based on the country of birth of the mother, except
when the mother is Dutch, in which case the country of birth of the father determines
the individual’s ethnicity. This definition thus encompasses first- and second-generation
immigrants.
The diversity index as given in Equation (4.1) is also calculated for restaurants based
on their ethnic background, that is the country of origin of the food served, in order to
measure immigrant-induced product diversity. In total, 20 categories of cuisine are
distinguished, of which one is considered Dutch (see Supplementary Appendix Table
A1). If there are more immigrants in a city, then it is very likely that there are more
ethnic restaurants, as shown by Waldfogel (2008); Mazzolari and Neumark (2012),
which may have a separate impact on the attractiveness of residential locations from the
mere presence of immigrants. Heterogeneity in consumption goods is generally linked
to an increasing attractiveness of cities (Glaeser and Mare, 2001). We therefore include
this third effect into our estimations.18
We take a 10% sample from the full data set and estimate our model using 48,491
observations.19 The sample is stratified by the municipality of work to ensure the spatial
representativeness of our data. Table 1 gives an overview of the variables that we focus
on. Given that the municipalities of residence and work can be different for an
individual, we compose each variable for the municipality of work and the municipality
of residence. Table 1 shows that the level of amenities in the cities of work in the sample
and the level of amenities in the cities of residence in the sample are statistically
different. Clearly, jobs are clustered in different cities than those that predominantly
have clusters of residential houses.
17 To be more precise, the maximum value of the index depends on the number of ethnic groups, m. The
maximum value is 1 1=m and approaches 1 in the limiting case in which m goes to infinity.
18 As is shown by footnote ‘a’ in Table 1, the correlation coefficient of the scale of immigrants and
restaurant diversity is larger than the correlation between immigrant diversity and restaurant diversity.
We implement robustness checks to look into a possible collinearity problem of including both
immigrant share and restaurant diversity.
19 Correctly determining the variance–covariance matrix of a finite mixture model is done by simulation
and is therefore rather time consuming. A reduced sample size (10%) facilitates estimation.
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5. Results
We assume a regional model with two types of workers and two types of firms that
value high- or low-amenity areas in both the labor and the housing market. This results
in four different groups that can be distinguished in our data. Between these four
groups, individuals have different preferences for ethnic diversity related to different
wages or utility levels.20 Subsection 5.1 first deals shortly with the common results for
all groups [being the set of individual (X) and housing (H) characteristics in Equations
(5.1) and (5.2)]. Subsequently, in subsection 5.2, we focus on the heterogeneous results
for the four groups, and subsection 5.3 lays out the ex-post group composition and
further explores the possible spatial distribution of the four groups.
5.1. Common results for all groups
The first part of the results, the coefficients 1 and 1 of regression Equations (5.1) and
(5.2) which are homogeneously estimated for all four groups, are given in the
Supplementary Appendix Tables A2 and A3, respectively. The coefficients of the
homogeneously estimated variables are as expected for both regressions. The standard
Table 1. Descriptives of selected variablesa
Variables City of work City of residence t-valueb
Mean (St.dev.) Mean (St.dev.)
Wagec E/year 39,813 (24,715)
House priced E/m2 2 051 (664)
Immigrant share 0.24 (0.13) 0.21 (0.11) 50.77
Immigrant diversity 0.91 (0.03) 0.91 (0.04) 6.41
Restaurant diversity 0.75 (0.12) 0.74 (0.13) 26.59
Restaurantse 7.78 (3.71) 7.25 (3.44) 27.13
Museumse 0.68 (0.48) 0.69 (0.56) –4.90
Theaterse 0.22 (0.17) 0.20 (0.17) 30.21
Shops ( 10) 13.01 (3.29) 12.51 (3.32) 27.83
Observations 48,522 48,522
Source: Based on data from Statistics Netherlands, NVM.
aThe correlation coefficient between Immigrant share and immigrant diversity (restaurant diversity) is
0:07ð0:64Þ, and between immigrant diversity and restaurant diversity is 0.11 for the sample of cities of
work. The correlation coefficient between immigrant share and immigrant diversity (restaurant diversity) is
0:06ð0:59Þ, and between immigrant diversity and restaurant diversity is 0.11 for the sample of cities of
residence.
bA paired t-test of the equality of means is performed, with H0 : work ¼ city. The means of the
independent variables are all statistically significantly different between the city of work and the city of
residence.
cThe yearly wage is given in 2008 prices.
dThe house price per square meter is given in 2008 prices.
eThe number of restaurants, museums and theaters are measured as the number per 10,000 inhabitants.
20 Information criteria show that from a statistical point of view, the optimal number of groups is larger
than 4; using more groups, however, does not change our main conclusions. In fact, the robustness
checks in Section 6 show that the results are rather robust to the number of groups.
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errors of the education dummies in Supplementary Appendix Table A2 are rather small
due to the omission of low-income groups. Accordingly, the negative coefficient for the
share of highly educated workers in the labor market might also be caused by our
sample; one would expect the share of highly educated workers in the labor market to
have a positive effect on wages. Diversity (of all ethnic groups including the Dutch) at
the neighborhood level21 is included for the housing price regression, and the impact is
negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that neighborhoods with a
more diverse population have, all other things being equal, lower housing prices. This
result is found in previous research as well, and can be caused by many mechanisms (see
e.g. Saiz, 2003; Sá, 2015). It might indicate that a diverse population is related to lower
housing prices, but it can also point towards the relationship between immigrants and
low-income neighborhoods and deprivation. For the purpose of this article, which is to
identify amenities at the city level, we separate the amenity effects at the city level from
the neighborhood level by controlling for neighborhood diversity. Estimation of the
homogeneous part of the regression excluding neighborhood diversity indeed shows
that the coefficients of population diversity at the city level in the heterogeneous part of
the regression are in general lower, indicating that failing to control for neighborhood
effects decreases the effect of diversity on the city level.
5.2. Group-specific results
Empirically, our estimation results in one large group (Group 3) containing 73% of the
individuals in our sample, and three small groups (the size of each group is given in
Table 2 and in the Supplementary Appendix Table A4). Group 1 contains about 9%,
and Groups 2 and 4 about 7 and 12% of all individuals, respectively. Figure 4 depicts
the distribution of the probabilities of the observations assigned to each group (an
individual is allocated to the group to which he or she has the highest probability of
belonging) and shows how well the groups are defined in terms of heterogeneity
between groups and the homogeneity within groups. If an individual has a probability
of almost 1 of being in a group and a probability of almost 0 of being in the other
groups, then we have perfect heterogeneity between groups and perfect homogeneity
within groups. The Whiskerplot in Figure 4 indicates that the within group
homogeneity and between group heterogeneity is substantial albeit not perfect. The
average probability of being in Group 1 is around 0.7, in Group 2 around 0.8, in Group
3 around 0.6 and in Group 4 around 0.5. Note that with nonrepeated observations, near
perfect segmentation is often harder to achieve than with repeated observations. The
effectiveness of the finite mixture model estimations to distinguish different groups in
the data in terms of their productivity and utility effects of ethnic diversity is thus
successful for the first two groups, moderately successful for the third group, while
Group 4 seems to be more of a rest group with partly observations that do not fit well in
either one of the groups. The posterior probabilities (given in Supplementary Appendix
Table A4) show that the number of observations in the data set that have a nonzero
probability of being in a given group. In our case, almost every observation in the data
21 Neighborhoods are defined by the Dutch Bureau for Statistics as architectural and historical
homogeneously parts of municipalities. Typically, the average population of a neighborhood is about
1000–2000 inhabitants, but it varies considerably with some neighborhoods reaching over 10,000
inhabitants in the larger cities.
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Table 2. Regression results FMM with four groupsa
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
No. of observations 4401 3615 34,880 5626
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Wage
Constant 10.027*** 0.011 10.553*** 0.019 10.182*** 0.010 10.175*** 0.010
Immigrant share 0.027*** 0.010 0.033** 0.015 0.039*** 0.005 0.010 0.006
Immigrant diversity 0.003 0.005 0.012 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.018*** 0.004
Restaurant diversity 0.014** 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.006
Historic center 0.028* 0.016 0.003 0.029 0.002 0.010 0.048*** 0.013
Restaurantsb 0.008 0.007 0.039** 0.016 0.011** 0.005 0.016* 0.008
Museumsb 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005
Theatersb 0.014** 0.006 0.028** 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.012** 0.005
Shops (10) 0.015** 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.014*** 0.004 0.002 0.006
Housing price
Constant 7.235*** 0.015 7.600*** 0.013 7.428*** 0.110 7.410*** 0.013
Immigrant share 0.070*** 0.007 0.032*** 0.008 0.087*** 0.005 0.105*** 0.010
Immigrant diversity 0.039*** 0.005 0.036*** 0.006 0.037*** 0.002 0.002 0.003
Restaurant diversity 0.030*** 0.006 0.027*** 0.006 0.016*** 0.003 0.047*** 0.006
Historic center 0.003 0.013 0.117*** 0.017 0.165*** 0.008 0.180*** 0.015
Restaurantsb 0.054*** 0.004 0.107*** 0.008 0.063*** 0.003 0.064*** 0.007
Museumsb 0.030*** 0.004 0.021*** 0.007 0.009*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.004
Theatersb 0.051*** 0.005 0.020*** 0.006 0.042*** 0.003 0.014** 0.007
Shops (10) 0.064*** 0.005 0.053*** 0.007 0.075*** 0.003 0.018*** 0.006
Source: own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands, NVM.
aHuber-White robust standard errors are reported. The statistical significance of coefficients is indicated
with ***, **, * for the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance levels, respectively. All variables, except historic
center, are standardized.
bThe number of restaurants, museums and theaters are measured per 10,000 inhabitants.
Figure 4. Distribution of probabilities of the observations in each group.
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set has a (very small) probability of being in any of the other groups. Based on these
descriptives of the fitting of the FMM, we believe that only Group 4 will show less
reliable results as the within-group homogeneity is relatively low.
Roback (1982) states that a positive coefficient for ethnic diversity in the labor
market indicates net disamenities for workers and that a positive coefficient for ethnic
diversity in the housing market indicates net amenities for workers. Ottaviano and
Peri (2006) elaborate on this interpretation by showing that a positive coefficient for
diversity in both markets signals a positive productivity effect. Firms are only willing to
locate to areas with higher land prices, if productivity (and thus wages) is sufficiently
high. This implies that workers are willing to pay higher house prices if those prices are
off set by higher wages, and there is no specific real-wage effect. A positive coefficient
for diversity in the labor market but a negative coefficient in the housing market signals
a negative utility effect, because workers need to be compensated for loss of utility by
lower house prices and/or higher wages, that is higher real wages. Likewise, a positive
coefficient for diversity in the housing market combined with a negative coefficient for
diversity in the labor market signals that workers are willing to accept a lower real wage
if the utility derived from diversity is positive.
The results of the heterogeneous part of the wage and house price regression are given
in Table 2. We mainly focus on the interpretation of the coefficients of the scale,
composition and consumer good effect of ethnic diversity because the other amenities
are included to control for other possible city characteristics and amenities that explain
wages and house prices. We follow the reasoning by Ottaviano and
Peri (2006), Roback (1982) as described above to interpret the results as a combined
effect in both markets.
Only the scale of ethnic diversity, that is the immigrant share, has a statistically
significant effect in both markets for all groups. Groups 2 and 3 derive a positive
productivity effect from a higher share of immigrants, while Group 1 derives a positive
utility effect and Group 4 a negative utility effect from immigrant share. Group 1 is thus
willing to accept a lower real wage if the share of immigrants is higher, while Group 4
requires a higher real wage to compensate for the disamenity they experience from a
higher share of immigrants. We find similar results in sign—but not in magnitude—for
immigrant diversity although the coefficients in the labor and housing market are only
both statistically significant for Group 1. The same holds for the found coefficients for
restaurant diversity. Interestingly, the found effect of restaurant diversity does not
necessarily coincide with immigrant share or immigrants diversity. For example, where
individuals in Group 4 derive a negative utility effect from the immigrant share, they
derive a positive utility effect from restaurant diversity.
To complete the analysis of the results, we need to know whether the estimated
coefficients for the scale (composition and consumer good effect) of ethnic diversity
from the labor and housing market are jointly statistically significant and how large the
estimated effects are in terms of implicit prices. To do so, we weigh the housing market
coefficients according to the budget share spent on housing. Using the estimated
coefficients in Table 2 and the mean income and the mean price per square meter in
Table 4, we can calculate the implicit prices of each ethnic diversity effect for the
different groups. We have to make some general assumptions about the yearly share of
income devoted to paying for housing (i.e. mortgage payments), and the part of the
total house price that is the price of land (i.e. that is not explained by dwelling
characteristics). Table 3 then shows if the combined effect is statistically significant and
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the implicit prices each group is willing to pay for ethnic diversity on a yearly base. We
assume a 120m2 house with a mortgage interest rate of 5%, and the ratio of the land
price to the total price of the house of 0.25.22
According to Table 3, Group 1 is willing to pay E903/year for housing for a one
standard deviation increase in immigrant share, and an additional E455 for a one
standard deviation increase in restaurant diversity. Groups 2, 3 and 4 are willing to pay
an additional amount for housing to decrease the share of immigrants, but for different
underlying trade-offs. For Groups 2 and 3, this trade-off relates to the increase in wages
they experience in areas with higher shares of immigrants, that is they are willing to
accept lower real wages to avoid immigrants. Group 4 is willing to pay to avoid
immigrants to increase utility. The magnitudes of the effects are about 2–3% of each
groups’ yearly income. This is rather high in absolute terms but if we take into
consideration that interest payments on mortgages are deductible from income taxes,
then the implicit prices are likely to be overestimated and to be about 1– 2% of each
groups’ yearly income.23
Overall, it seems that we only find statistically significant results for all groups for the
scale of immigrants, and for 80% of the individuals in our sample, this relates to them
experiencing higher wages in areas with more immigrants (i.e. a positive productivity
externality). For about 9% of the individuals (Group 1), utility is higher if the share of
Table 3. Welfare effects of scale, composition and consumer good effect of ethnic diversitya
Implicit price
Scale Composition Consumer goods
(Immigrant share) (Immigrant diversity) (Restaurant diversity)
Marginalb
Group 1 902.53*** 163.55 455.22**
Group 2 2736.58** 887.27 839.89
Group 3 1170.25*** 33.82 233.41
Group 4 689.82*** 668.33*** 217.68
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands, NVM.
aThe implicit prices are calculated based on the calculation given in Roback (1982): p ¼ ½klðd log r=dsÞ
ðd logw=dsÞw, where w is the mean yearly income of each group from Table 4 and kl is the mean budget
share of land for each group based on the mean price per square meter of each group. The budget share of
land is calculated by multiplying the yearly expenditures on a mortgage with a 5% interest rate for a 120
m2 house, with the price of land fixed at 0.25 of the total transaction price.
bThe implicit prices are given in euros per standard deviation as the variables are standardized in the
regression. Significance of the effects are calculated for the null hypothesis that the joint effect of diversity
from both markets is zero, against the hypothesis that the effect is not zero. The coefficient on the housing
market(1), its variance, and its covariance are weighted by kl, the mean budget share. The t-value of then




l þ varð2Þ  2  covð1; 2Þ  kl
q
Þ. The ***, **, * indicate that the null
hypothesis is rejected at the 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1 significance level, respectively.
22 See, for more details, the footnote of Table 3 and Roback (1982).
23 This is the result if we assume that 40% of the costs for housing is exempt.
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immigrants is higher and restaurant diversity is higher (consumer good effect).
Immigrant diversity is a disutility for about 12% (Group 4) of the individuals in the
data. For the other groups, the joint estimates of immigrant diversity in the labor and
housing market are not statistically significant. Except for Group 1, restaurant diversity
is not statistically significant. If we compare our results to the research by Ottaviano
and Peri (2006), Alesina et al. (2016), we find similar results that for the majority of the
people in our data, immigrants share and immigrant diversity have a positive
correlation with productivity; however, in our research the productivity effect of
immigrant diversity is not statistically significant for any of the groups. In this sense, we
do not find the same results as Trax et al. (2015); Kemeny and Cooke (2018) who focus
on the immigrant diversity effect on productivity and do find positive statistically
significant results for this relationship. Our results also show that for a small group of
people in our data, the effects of immigrant diversity and immigrant share are not
related to positive productivity effects, but related to positive or negative utility effects.
Although the housing market regression shows statistically significant results for
restaurant diversity, the joint interpretation of these results with those from the labor
market indicates that the effect of restaurant diversity is only relevant for a small group
of people in our data set.
5.3. Group composition and spatial sorting
By ex post facto summarizing the characteristics of individuals in each group (an
individual is allocated to the group to which he or she has the highest probability of
belonging), we further explore how those groups differ in terms of income and
education, but also whether the differences between groups may give a conjecture of
spatial sorting or not. Firstly, Table 4 shows that the most distinctive features between
the groups are income and geographical concentration. Group 2 has the highest income,
which is in line with the finding that this group has higher constant terms in both
regressions. Group 1 has relatively lower incomes and education levels,24 and even
though Kemeny and Cooke (2018) find no differences between the effect of diversity on
wages for different wage quantiles, the income level might explain why this group does
not derive a positive productivity effect from a denser and internationally oriented work
location. Groups 3 and 4 are very alike in terms of income and education levels.
However, the geographical concentration of Group 4 appears to be different. About
29% of the individuals in Group 4 live in one of the four largest cities in the
Netherlands.
Individuals in the different groups in our data are thus most likely not randomly
allocated over cities. If the allocation is not random, then differences in the correlations
between different measures of ethnic diversity and productivity or utility can be
amplified by sorting and the subsequent concentration of specific groups in specific
cities. Mapping the over- and under-concentration of the groups at labor market areas
(measured at the 3-level of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics or
24 We want to stress again that our sample does not include individuals in the commercial or social rent
category but only homeowners. The group with lower average education levels and lower average
incomes are thus at the lower end of the distribution of these variables for homeowners. From the
descriptive statistics, it can be seen that Group 1 is still fairly highly educated and has a high income if
compared to the whole of the Netherlands. Our sample of only homeowners leads to this bias.
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NUTS-3 level) by calculating a location quotient (LQ) for each group and the
corresponding Moran’s I, shows that the spatial allocation of individuals over groups is
not random.
In Figure 5, over-representation or clustering of a group is given in black, while
under-representation is given in light gray. For mapping purposes, we log-linearize the
LQ. For the geography of the Netherlands, it is important to know that immigrants are
under-represented in the periphery of the country (the northern and southern parts),
which has a relatively low population density. In the middle part of the country, the
presence of immigrants is average, while most immigrants are clustered in the
Randstad, the part of the country that contains the largest cities in the western region.
The southern corridor of the Randstad area consists of Rotterdam and The Hague, and
the northern corridor consists of Amsterdam and Utrecht. Furthermore, a distinction is
often made between different areas in the middle of the country in terms of productivity
(number of jobs and sector clusters), abundance of amenities (consumer and natural
amenities), and thus in general the attractiveness of the different cities in this area,
especially for individuals with a preference for ‘urban’ surroundings.
As could be expected because of the size of the group, Group 3 has the smallest
variation of all groups and is evenly distributed across the country proportional to the
Table 4. Socioeconomic and demographic group characteristics
Variables Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Mean wage E/year 28,173 87,219 36,856 36,789
Mean housing price E/m2 1351 2.951 2047 2044
Mean age 32 36 32 32
% immigrant (first or second generation) 15 13 13 16
% university degree (educated 19 42 28 25
Household type
% single person 29 20 27 28
% couple with children 29 42 27 26
% couple without children 40 36 45 44
% working and living 33 24 30 33
In same municipality
% working and living 52 45 52 55
In same NUTS3 region
Average commuting distance incl. 35 29 26 23
Same municipality (km)
Average commuting distance excl. 52 38 37 34
Same municipality (km)
% working in four largest cities 24 29 25 32
Amsterdam 9 14 10 10
Rotterdam 5 4 5 7
Utrecht 3 7 6 5
The Hague 8 4 4 11
% Living in four largest cities 17 15 16 29
Amsterdam 2 6 5 4
Rotterdam 3 3 3 6
Utrecht 3 4 6 4
The Hague 10 3 2 15
Source: Based on data from Statistics Netherlands, NVM.
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actual population distribution over the Netherlands. This conclusion is supported by
the measure of spatial autocorrelation given in Table 5. Moran’s I for this group is the
lowest.25 There is no strong indication that the individuals in this group would sort into








Figure 5. Spatial clustering of groups across NUTS3-regions.
25 The expected value of Moran’s I for all groups is 0.026 under the null hypothesis of no spatial
correlation, that is spatial randomness.
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choices, location path dependency and social ties, or job opportunities probably play a
much more vital role in explaining the location of the individuals in this group as is
referred to by, for example, Kemeny and Storper (2012).
Groups 1, 2 and 4 show a stronger spatial pattern with moderate, albeit statistically
significant, clustering. Group 1 is clustered further away from the economic core of the
Netherlands in areas that are considered less abundant in amenities, especially man-
made amenities, and that have a lower concentration of immigrants. Group 2 is
clustered in the economic centers of the Netherlands in terms of work location, and is
residentially clustered in the amenity-rich areas, both in terms of consumer amenities as
well as natural amenities. This group lives and works in areas with higher concentra-
tions of immigrants. This is especially true of the northern corridor of the Randstad.
Group 4 also lives and works in areas with higher concentrations of immigrants, but
this group is more concentrated in the southern corridor of the Randstad and outside of
Amsterdam and Utrecht in the north. In this regard, Group 4 seems to be the opposite
of Group 2, a difference that is likely to be driven by the result that Group 4, as
opposed to Group 2, derives a negative utility from living in cities with a higher
immigrant share and diversity.
6. Robustness Checks
To validate our results, we have conducted various robustness checks. A first main
concern might be that, as the results are based on four groups, the data actually
distinguishe more, or less, groups. Therefore, we estimate our models with 2, 3 and 5
groups (the estimation for five groups converges into four groups). The results of these
estimations can be found in the Supplementary Appendix (Tables A10–A15).26 We find
that in all estimations, one large group and several smaller groups are distinguished in
the data. For the estimation with two and three groups, the results for the largest group
Table 5. Moran’s I of Location Quotientsa
Moran’s I
Group Labor market Housing market
Group 1 0.18 0.16
Group 2 0.16 0.12
Group 3 0.08 0.04
Group 4 0.17 0.08
Source: own calculations based on Statistics Netherlands, NVM.
aMoran’s I is calculated for the log-linearized location quotients, using the inverse of the Eucledian distance
between the centroids of NUTS3 regions. The H0 hypothesis of spatial randomness of location of
individuals within a group is tested against the H1 hypothesis of spatial autocorrelation. All values are
statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level.
26 We only report the heterogeneous part of the estimation in these tables. Note that we report the groups
as indicated in the results, which means that group numbers are random (Group 3 is not always the
largest group, etc.).






/joeg/article-abstract/20/1/197/5259356 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 27 July 2020
are comparable with the largest group in our base regression with four groups. The
smaller groups are comparable as well in the sense that there is a group for which the
composition and consumer good effect of ethnic diversity are a positive utility effect as
opposed to a productivity effect.
In this article, we assume that the location choice of work and residence is
interrelated and we therefore estimate the wage and housing price equations
simultaneously. To test the validity of this assumption, we estimate the wage and
house price regressions separately.27 Using four groups, the wage regression with the
finite mixture model results in convergence to three groups, while the housing price
regression has convergence issues. This indicates that the correlation between the two
regressions does indeed lead to different results as the interaction between the two is
needed to identify unobserved heterogeneity. As work locations are often more
clustered than residential locations, our integrated estimation allows for the possibility
that individuals that obtain the same wage in the same city of work, may live in different
locations with different amenities and house prices, and may therefore have different
utility or productivity trade-offs. Again, in the estimations with separate wage and
housing price regressions, we find one large group, and several much smaller groups.
For the largest group, the wage and house price regression results are comparable to
those of the largest group in the base regression. However, the interpretation of the
results may differ, as we would interpret the results in terms of a positive utility effect as
opposed to a positive productivity effect. The results of the group with the highest
constant in each regression is comparable with the group with the highest constant in
the base regression (the group with the highest income).
Additionally, we want to be sure our results are not confined by the sample we used
in our estimation. As we use a 10% stratified (by place of work) sample from the data
set for our estimations, we re-ran the model on two different, stratified, samples from
the main data set. The results of these two samples are given in Supplementary
Appendix Tables A5–A7. Over the different samples, we consequently find that for
most individuals the estimated coefficients have a consistent sign for immigrant share
and immigrant diversity, that is if immigrant share has a positive correlation with wages
(or house prices), immigrant diversity has a positive correlation with wages (or house
prices) as well. However, the coefficients are not always both statistically significant. In
these alternative samples, we still find one large group (Group 4 in subsample 1 and
Group 3 in subsample 2) with comparable results for the scale, composition and
consumer good effect in the housing market. Generally, we thus find that for most
individuals in our data set, the scale of immigrant diversity is positively related to
productivity, while the positive correlation between productivity and the composition of
immigrant diversity is mostly not statistically significantly different from zero. The
robustness checks for restaurant diversity show mixed results; the results are not always
exactly comparable in terms of sign, but generally restaurant diversity is not statistically
significant in the wage regression for most individuals in our data set. The coefficient
for restaurant diversity is statistically significant for everyone in the housing price
regression.
Finally, a rather substantial concern that needs to be addressed, is a collinearity
problem in our estimations that may arise from the correlation between immigrant
27 See the Supplementary Appendix Tables A10–A15 for the results.






/joeg/article-abstract/20/1/197/5259356 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 27 July 2020
share and restaurant diversity. We know that areas with more immigrants have more
diverse restaurants but the relationship is not direct, as obviously not all immigrants are
restaurant owners, and not all ethnic restaurants are located where immigrants reside.
There is thus a multitude of mechanisms that may explain this relationship (some are
described in the Introduction section), which we are not able to disentangle in our data
set. For the full sample, the correlation coefficient between immigrant share and
restaurant diversity (immigrant diversity) is 0.64 (–0.07), and between immigrant
diversity and restaurant diversity is 0.11 for the sample of cities of work.28 The
correlation coefficient between immigrant share and restaurant diversity (immigrant
diversity) is 0.59 (–0.06), and between immigrant diversity and restaurant diversity is
0.11 for the sample of cities of residence. The correlation between immigrant share and
restaurant diversity is substantially large to cause concern for (multi)collinearity.
Collinearity may cause two problems for our regression results. Firstly, standard errors
are higher if collinearity is present and the chance of a type II error (false negative) for
some variables increases. Second, if variables are highly correlated, estimates of their
individual effects on the dependent variable become less reliable and more unstable.
If we look at the correlation matrices for immigrant share and restaurant diversity for
the different FMM groups in our estimation, then we see that there are small differences
in the correlation between immigrant share and restaurant diversity between the groups
(Supplementary Appendix Table A8). The differences between the groups are not large
enough to conclude that it is an issue for only some groups but not for others, but
Group 4 seems to have the largest concerns for collinearity. Collinearity in the data
between immigrant share and restaurant diversity is a bigger problem for the city of
work than the city of residence. The differences in these correlation coefficients between
the city of work and the city of residence of about one-tenth point seem to impact part
of our results. If we run the base regression of Table 2 without restaurant diversity, then
the standard errors for immigrant share decrease substantially in the wage regression
and the coefficients for immigrant diversity become statistically significant
(Supplementary Appendix Table A10). Although the standard errors are lower, the
estimated coefficients of immigrant share do not change substantially compared to the
base regression and we are now less concerned that these results are unstable or
unreliable. In addition, the estimates for all the other control variables are comparable
to the base regression. Without restaurant diversity, immigrant diversity becomes
statistically significant in the wage regressions and we find a positive productivity effect
of immigrant diversity for Groups 2 and 3, and a positive utility effect for Group 1. This
may point toward type II errors for immigrant diversity in the base regression even
though the correlation between immigrant diversity and restaurant diversity or
immigrant share is low. Immigrant diversity then has a positive correlation with
productivity and utility for some groups, but the size of the effect is much smaller than
that for immigrant share. The estimations for Group 4 seem to suffer most from
possible collinearity, which is probably also related to the fact that this group is
considered a ‘rest’ group with lower within-group homogeneity of the observations.
28 The correlation coefficient for immigrants share and restaurant diversity for the city of work is
comparable to the correlation coefficient for immigrant share and immigant diversity in Trax
et al. (2015).
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Given the possible mechanisms underlying the effects of immigrants on wages and
housing prices combined with correlation coefficients between immigrant share and
restaurant diversity of 0.59 and 0.68, there is a collinearity problem and the estimations
without restaurant diversity indeed impact the results for some groups. However, the
collinearity is not large enough to conclude that immigrant share and restaurant
diversity measure the same relation in our data, and omitting restaurant diversity may
result in a specification error and overestimation of the effect of immigrant diversity on
utility or productivity. However, this clearly also calls for more research that is better
able to directly measure the impact of these different mechanisms on utility.
7. Conclusions
This article analyses the differences between individuals in terms of the utility and the
productivity derived from the scale, composition and consumer good effect of ethnic
diversity. We estimate a latent class model in which individuals are endogenously
assigned to groups based on these differences. Our article contributes to the existing
literature by modeling and estimating the location of work and residence of workers
simultaneously, taking into account unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and the
subsequent possibility of spatial sorting of individuals based on these preferences.
Because we estimate the effects on both the labor and housing market, we can interpret
the regression results in terms of a dominant utility or productivity effect of ethnic
diversity.
We find one large group and three small groups of (within group) homogeneous
individuals. For most individuals in our data set, the immigrant share has a positive
productivity effect. So, working in cities with a larger share of immigrants is associated
with higher workers’ wages, leading to higher housing prices. For one small group, the
consumer good effect in the form of restaurant diversity has a positive amenity affect;
these workers value living in areas with a large diversity in cuisines. The sizes of these
ethnic diversity effects differ between the four groups, but in terms of implicit prices the
differences are moderate and do not exceed 1–2% of net yearly income.
The groups we identified differ significantly in their composition, most pronounced
in terms of income levels, education and to a much smaller extent spatial concentration,
which seem to be the individual differences that matter most in revealing preferences for
immigrant composition and induced amenities. Based on geographical clustering and a
measure of spatial autocorrelation, we find evidence that only the small groups sort
themselves into specific and distinct locations in the Netherlands based on amenities.
However, for the majority of our sample (70%), no evidence for spatial sorting can be
found for the scale, composition and consumer good effect of ethnic diversity. Based on
this analysis, we conclude that these amenities do not seem to play a (large) role for
sorting and it is more likely that individuals sort over locations based on life-cycle
choices, social ties and job opportunities, as is described for the USA by Kemeny and
Storper (2012), and by Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) for immigrant-specific location
decisions. The results are robust against checks for the number of groups, and checks
that simultaneously estimated regression give different results for the wage and rent
regressions. The estimated FMM is fairly successful in identifying different homoge-
neous groups within the data although panel data would be preferred for the best
performance of a FMM. Based on the robustness checks, we are confident that it is
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predominantly the scale of ethnic diversity that impacts productivity or utility, and that,
at the city-wide level, the composition of immigrants and the consumer good effect are
much less significant.
Both the association between ethnic diversity and productivity and utility and the
heterogeneity of these effects between the different groups are moderate in an absolute
sense. Part of these moderate findings may be due to the reason that we cannot include
individuals in the (social) rent sector, and therefore cannot include individuals at the
lower end of the income and education distribution. The description of individual
characteristics shows that income, and to a certain extent, location are the most distinct
features between the groups, and excluding the rental sector disproportionally affects
the distribution of these variables in our data set. Additionally, groups with higher
incomes (and thus individuals with different education levels) are generally considered
to have a higher mobility and are more likely to move into larger cities. This further
restricts the generalization of our results and a clear identification of heterogeneous
groups for the whole of the Netherlands.
In this article, it becomes clear that more research is needed to identify the exact scale,
in combination with the exact mechanisms at that scale, at which the effect of
immigrant diversity might be at play. Immigrant diversity or consumer good effects
may not play a large role at the city-wide level, but within cities they may be much more
important for utility. Individuals are not randomly distributed within cities and not all
individuals within the same city are exposed to the same level of ethnic diversity. The
amenity landscape of ethnic diversity can be very different in different parts of the same
city. Within-city allocation and the effects of ethnic diversity on utility then become an
important research question [see e.g. Davis et al. (2017), Bakens et al. (2018)].
Supplementary material
Supplementary data for this article are available at Journal of Economic Geography
online.
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